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Two Anecdotes 
A Synthetic Approach to 
the Study of Animal 
Intelligence 1 
Alan C. Kamil 
University of Massachusetts 
It is 7:00 A.M. The sun has just risen over the botanical gar-dens, and my research team and 
I are about to give up our attempt to catch a male Anna's hummingbird 
with a discrete white spot behind his left eye. "Spot" has been defend-
ing a small, flower-rich territory, and we want to put a colored plastic 
band on his leg as part of our study of nectar-foraging patterns. To catch 
Spot we had arrived before sunrise and strung a mist net, 5 feet high and 
18 feet long, across the middle of his territory. Mist nets, made of very 
thin black nylon thread, are designed to entangle any bird that flies into 
them. Unfortunately, a heavy dew at sunrise had collected on the strands 
of the net, and Spot saw it immediately. He had flown along it and even 
perched on it. Experience has taught us that once a hummingbird has 
done this, it will never fly into the net. So we were about to take down 
the net, but first we were having a cup of coffee. Spot was sitting on his 
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favorite perch, overlooking the territory from its southwest edge. Sud-
denly an intruding hummingbird flew into the territory from the north-
east and began to feed. 
Male Anna's hummingbirds are extraordinarily aggressive animals. 
Usually they will utter their squeaky territorial song and fly directly at 
an intruder, chasing it out of the territory. But that is not what Spot does. 
He silently drops from his perch and flies around the perimeter of the 
territory, staying close to the ground, until he is behind the other bird. 
Then he gives his song and chases the intruder-directly into the mist 
net. Spot pulls up short, hovers over the bird, utters another burst of 
song, and returns to his perch. 
This anecdote raises many questions with interesting implications. 
For example, did Spot have a "cognitive map" of his territory that al-
lowed him to understand that if he moved to a point behind the other 
bird he could force the intruder into the net? Since this is only an anec-
dote, it provides no definitive answer. But many more mundane em-
pirical studies of nectar-feeding birds offer systematic data showing that 
they do possess considerable knowledge about spatial and temporal 
patterns of food production on their territories (Gass & Montgomerie, 
1981; Gill & Wolf, 1977; Gill, in press; Kamil, 1978). 
Consider this observation of chimpanzees reported by Goodall: 
The juvenile female Pooch approaches high-ranking Circe and 
reaches for one of her bananas. Circe at once hits out at the 
youngster, whereupon Pooch, screaming very loudly indeed, runs 
from camp in an easterly direction. Her response to the rather mild 
threat seems unnecessarily violent. After two minutes, the screams 
give way to waa-barks, which get progressively louder as Pooch 
retraces her steps. After a few moments she reappears; stopping 
about 5 meters from Circe, she gives an arm-raise threat along with 
another waa-bark. Following behind Pooch, his hair slightly bris-
tling, is the old male Huxley (who had left camp shortly before in 
an easterly direction). Circe, with a mild threat gesture towards 
Pooch and a glance at Huxley, gets up and moves away. Pooch has 
study of learning, Daniel S. Lehrman and Robert Lockard for first directing my atten-
tion toward biology and ecology, and Charles Van Riper III for his guidance during 
my first research experience outside the cloisters of the laboratory. I would also like 
to thank Sonja I. Yoerg, Kevin Clements, and Deborah Olson for their comments and 
suggestions on a previous version of this chapter. 
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used Huxley as a "social tool." This little sequence can be under-
stood only because we know of the odd relationship between the 
juvenile and the old male who served on many occasions as her 
protector and was seldom far away. (Goodall, 1986, p. 567) 
There are many objections to the use of anecdotes such as these. As 
Thorndike (1898) pointed out, hundreds of dogs get lost every day and 
nobody pays much attention except the unfortunate dogs' owners. But 
let one dog find its way from Cambridge to London, or Boston to New 
Haven, and it becomes a famous anecdote. Anecdotes cannot provide 
definitive evidence about animal intelligence (or anything else). But it 
may be a serious mistake to completely ignore their implications, which 
can provide interesting hypotheses for rigorous test. 
Furthermore, the two anecdotes related above are not isolated ex-
amples. Most fieldworkers have similar stories from their own experi-
ence. Books such as Goodall (1986) and Smuts (1985) are replete with 
them (see also Kummer, 1982; Kummer & Goodall, 1985). Much more 
important than the number of these anecdotes, however, is the fact that 
empirical data are being amassed to support their specific implications. 
The main point is that these anecdotes and supporting data suggest that 
the traditional psychological approach to the study of animal learning is 
too limited. 
Psychologists have been studying animal learning for about a cen-
tury. This century of experimental and theoretical work has produced 
some remarkable successes, particularly in understanding basic condi-
tioning processes. However, these successes are limited in two major 
ways. First, they have been confined to a narrow domain. Recent re-
search from a variety of settings has demonstrated that animals have 
mental abilities far beyond what they were given credit for just a few 
years ago. We must dramatically expand the range of phenomena ad-
dressed by the study of animal learning. Second, there has been an al-
most complete failure to place animal learning in any kind of compara-
tive, evolutionary framework, primarily because of a failure to develop 
any detailed understanding of how animals use their ability to learn out-
side the laboratory. Recent developments in psychology and biology are 
beginning to suggest how this gap may be filled. 
The expansion of the range of phenomena under study is already well 
under way, with the emergence of the cognitive approach to animal 
learning (Hulse, Fowler, & Honig, 1978; Roitblat, Bever, & Terrace, 1984) 
and diverse new techniques for exploring the capacities of animals 
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(Griffin, 1976, 1978). The development of a meaningful comparative ap-
proach is also beginning to emerge, thanks to developments in both 
psychology and biology. 
My purpose in this chapter is to outline the beginnings of a new way 
to study animal intelligence. I have labeled this the synthetic approach 
because it represents an attempt to synthesize the approaches of psy-
chology, ethology, and behavioral ecology. I have used the term intel-
ligence, rather than more specific terms such as learning or cognition, 
to emphasize the breadth of the phenomena to be included. The syn-
thetic approach builds upon previous successes but is much broader and 
more biological than the predominantly psychological approaches of the 
past. Its goal is to develop a full understanding of the intellectual abili-
ties of animals, with particular emphasis on psychological mechanisms 
and functional Significance. 
What I am proposing is not a new theory. Rather, it is an attempt to 
outline a new scientific research program (Lakatos, 1974). According to 
Lakatos, research programs consist of two parts: a central core of laws, 
principles, and assumptions that are not subject to direct empirical test, 
and a protective belt of "auxiliary hypotheses" that relate the central core 
to observations and can be tested and perhaps rejected. The central core 
and its auxiliary hypotheses function to direct research toward certain 
problems and away from others. In these terms, I am urging two changes 
in the central core of the psychological approach to animal learning: a 
broadening of the discipline's domain and the adaptation of a biological 
and ecological approach to the study of learning. These changes could 
redirect attention to important and interesting facets of animal learning 
that have been ignored by the traditional psychological approach. 
The Traditional Approach 
The purpose of this section is to identify the central core of the psycho-
logical study of animal learning. There are two difficulties. First, the 
programs Lakatos discusses are from the history of physics, with ex-
plicit, usually mathematical, specifications of their central core. In the 
case of animal learning, the central core is less formalized and more dif-
ficult to specify. Another difficulty is that although it is easy to talk and 
write about "the traditional approach" to animal learning in psycholo-
gy, in fact there have been a number of different approaches. Nonethe-
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less, a few assumptions have been widespread, if not universal. Some 
of these assumptions formed the central core of the scientific reseach 
programs that have dominated animal-learning psychology and have 
directed attention away from important phenomena and issues. 
GENERAL PROCESSES 
One basic assumption has been that one or a very few general principles 
can account for all of animal learning. A variety of principles have been 
proposed, but the two dominant ones have been associationism and re-
inforcement theory. 
Rescorla (1985) provides an extremely coherent overview of the as-
sociationist approach that is remarkable in the extent to which it agrees, 
in form, with Lakatos's description of a research program. The central 
core is the assumption that virtually all learning can be understood as 
the formation of an association between two events. The associationist 
approach then attempts to explain the diversity and richness of an ani-
mal's knowledge of its world not by hypothesizing a richness and di-
versity of learning mechanisms, but by weaving a web of auxiliary hy-
potheses around the central learning mechanism. Rescorla (1985) 
identifies three types of auxiliary hypotheses that serve this function: the 
complexity of the conditions that govern the formation of associations, 
a wide range of elements that can be associated, and multiple mecha-
nisms by which associations can affect behavior. These auxiliary hy-
potheses have made associationism a powerful force for understanding 
some aspects of learning in animals, a force that is often underappre-
ciated by those working in other areas. 
The central core of reinforcement theory is that behavior can best be 
understood in terms of the strengthening or weakening effects of rein-
forcers and punishers on the responses that have preceded them. This 
was first clearly formulated by Thorndike (1911) and has been elaborat-
ed in many ways by others ( Herrnstein, 1970; Skinner, 1938). Like as-
sociationism, reinforcement theory attempts to account for the richness 
and diversity of behavior by using a single principle with a web of aux-
iliary hypotheses. Among these hypotheses are the complexity of the 
effects of schedules of reinforcement and alterations in the definition of 
what constitutes a reinforcer. The study of reinforcement has made many 
important contributions to our understanding of learning. 
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Although associationism and reinforcement theory have proved to 
be powerful concepts, they have often been overemphasized. There are 
too many phenomena they cannot easily account for, including those 
studied by many cognitive animal psychologists and those beginning to 
be revealed by naturalistic studies of intelligence. The learning of as-
sociations between events and the effects of reinforcement must be in-
vestigated as part of any study of animal learning and intelligence. But 
these two principles in themselves cannot completely account for how 
animals adapt their behavior on the basis of experience. 
RADICAL BEHAVIORISM 
Two kinds of behaviorism need to be distinguished. Methodological be-
haviorism simply recognizes that behavior is what we must measure in 
experiments. Its central tenet is that all the mechanisms we may theo-
rize about are known to us only through behavior. 
Radical behaviorism goes beyond stating that it is behavior we seek 
to understand. According to the radical behaviorist, any theoretical con-
structs, especially about cognitive structures animals may possess, are 
not just unnecessary, but dangerous (Skinner, 1977); behavior can best 
be understood in terms of the functions that relate stimulus events to 
responses. 
Radical behaviorism has been unremitting in its concentration on the 
similarities between species. For example, an often-quoted comment of 
Skinner's (1959) accompanies the cumulative records from several spe-
cies: "Pigeon, rat, monkey, which is which? It doesn't matter ... once 
you have allowed for differences in the ways in which they make con-
tact with the environment, and in the ways in which they act upon the 
environment, what remains of their behavior shows astonishingly sim-
ilar properties" (pp. 374-375). 
The interesting aspect of this quotation is that it acknowledges the 
existence of differences between species but relegates them to the realm 
of the uninteresting. It provides a clear case of Lakatos's (1974) concept 
of a negative heuristic, directing research away from certain topics. For 
the synthetic approach, these differences are of interest. If they had been 
of more interest to the radical behaviorist, phenomena such as auto-
shaping and instinctive drift (see below) would have come as less of a 
surprise. 
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Another problem with the radical behaviorist position has been that 
it tends to be radically environmentalistic, regarding the organism as a 
tabula rasa upon which experience writes. This emphasis ignores the 
potential importance of the effects of genetics and evolutionary history. 
The emerging current view, particularly apparent in the cognitive ap-
proach to animalleaming, is that organisms bring certain processes, such 
as attention and memory, to bear on problems. This in turn has serious 
implications for evolutionary analyses of animal intelligence. 
COMPARATIVE GENERALITY 
Another traditional assumption has been that the basic properties of an-
imallearning are the same in a wide variety of organisms, which has jus-
tified the use of relatively few species in animal learning research. The 
logic underlying this assumption may have been that many of the psy-
chologists studying animal learning were not primarily interested in the 
species they studied, but were using these species as convenient sub-
stitutes for humans. Therefore the only learning processes of real inter-
est were those that could be generalized to our own species. This is a 
coherent, sensible approach, but it suffers from a basic flaw. The ani-
mals under investigation are biological entities, with their own evolu-
tionary history. The way that evolutionary history might influence the 
outcome of learning experiments was not considered by most psychol-
ogists. 
As reviewed below, there are special and substantial logical and 
methodological problems confronting the comparative analysis of 
learning and intelligence in animals. But to assume the absence of such 
differences, or at least their relative unimportance, has some major 
drawbacks because it places the study of learning outside the realm of 
modern evolutionary theory. Suppose there are, in fact, no important 
differences in the processes of learning among a wide variety of spe-
cies-say, all vertebrates. This would imply that learning plays no 
adaptive role at all for vertebrates. Indeed, a number of ethologists (e.g., 
Lorenz, 1965) and psychologists (Boice, 1977; Lockard, 1971) have sug-
gested that learning is relatively unimportant to animals in their natural 
environments. But more recent data have clearly demonstrated that 
learning and memory do function in crucial ways for foraging animals 
(Kamil, Krebs, & Pulliam, 1987; Kamil & Sargent, 1981; Shettleworth, 
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1984) and animals in social situations (Cheney, Seyfarth, & Smuts, 1986; 
Kummer, 1982). As is explained in more detail below, evidence for the 
functional significance of learning is evidence that there must be signif-
icant variation in intelligence between species. 
EMPTY METHODOLOGICAL SOPHISTICATION 
Bolles (1985a) suggested that an angry god put a terrible curse on psy-
chology: "You will never discover anything about underlying causal 
processes, and you will never ever understand the overlying functional 
significance of anything. You will be forever doomed to be methodolo-
gists. You will content yourselves with teaching each other how to do 
experiments, and you will never know what they mean" (p. 137). Ac-
cording to Bolles, because of this curse psychologists have become more 
caught up with their procedures than with the animals they study. 
Another way to express this problem is to say that psychologists have 
concentrated disproportionately on internal validity and ignored the is-
sue of external validity. Internal validity refers to the internal logic of the 
experiment, including factors such as the absence of confounding con-
ditions and the adequacy of controls. External validity refers to the ex-
tent to which the results of laboratory studies can be generalized be-
yond the laboratory situation. When one designs a single experiment, 
there tends to be a trade-off between internal and external validity. Well-
designed and well-controlled experiments are generally carried out 
under highly artificial or constrained conditions, which limits external 
validity. But at some point, any area of scientific endeavor must be con-
cerned with the issue of external validity. 
For example, consider the study of language acquisition by children. 
At one time this field was dominated by laboratory research in highly 
constrained situations and theoretical work on transformational gram-
mars. But at some point researchers began to ask whether the ideas de-
veloping from this laboratory work could deal accurately with the actual 
process of language acquisition as it occurs in normal circumstances. This 
in turn led to many naturalistic studies of language acquisition, whose 
results have had a large impact on theoretical ideas and laboratory re-
search (Gardner, 1978). 
The only external referent for animal learning research has been ap-
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plied research with humans and animals. The applied work with ani-
mals immediately suggested problems (Breland & Breland, 1961), but 
they were largely ignored. The applied work with humans has had some 
success, but this too has been limited (Schwartz, 1984). What we need 
are additional external referents against which to judge the generality 
and importance of the information we have gained about animal learn-
ing and intelligence. As we shall see below, the absence of external cri-
teria has caused particularly serious problems for comparative analyses 
of animal learning. 
In summary, then, there are several problems with the traditional ap-
proach: a concentration on just a few general processes, with the pos-
sible elimination from consideration of many others; a concentration on 
behavior, ignoring the processes with which animals are endowed; the 
lack of an evolutionary, comparative framework; and the lack of sub-
stantial measures of external validity. These problems with the tradi-
tional approach have had particularly serious implications for the com-
parative analysis of learning and intelligence. 
The Comparative Analysis of Intelligence 
The traditional psychological approach to animal learning has largely 
ignored comparative questions, concentrating research on just a few 
species. This tendency has been documented and criticized many times 
over the past 35 to 40 years (Beach, 1950; Bitterman, 1960). Despite this, 
most learning research in psychology is still conducted with just a few 
species. Why has this criticism had so little effect? 
One reason is the commitment to general processes. The assumption 
has been that just a few general processes can explain most learning in 
many species. If that were true, there would be no reason not to con-
centrate on a few available species. And of course the general principles 
of association and reinforcement have been demonstrated (but not 
studied in depth) in a wide range of species. One must wonder, how-
ever, to what extent the emphasis on general process has restricted the 
view of the animal learning psychologist. 
Another important reason for the lack of comparative work among 
traditional animal learning psychologists is the substantial methodolog-
ical and theoretical problems presented by any comparative analysis of 
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learning. The major methodological problem involves the difficulty of 
measuring species differences in learning because of the learning/per-
formance distinction. The major theoretical problem is due to the logical 
status of the so-called mechanisms of learning. 
THE LEARNING-PERFORMANCE DISTINCTION 
As Bitterman (1960, 1965) has so clearly articulated, the performance of 
a species in a particular situation is a joint function of its abilities and the 
particulars of the task presented. Thus the failure of a species (or an in-
dividual) to perform well on a particular test does not necessarily mean 
the species lacks the ability for which it is supposedly being tested. 
Rather, it may be that the situation is in some way inappropriate. A spe-
cies may fail to solve a problem, for example, not because it is incapable 
of solution in a general way, but because the experiment was improp-
erly conducted. In Bitterman's terms, some contextual variable, such as 
motivational level or response requirement, may have been inappro-
priate. 
Bitterman's (1965) solution to this problem is "control by systematic 
variation," in which one systematically varies the contextual variables 
in an attempt to find a situation in which the species will perform well 
on the task. So, for example, one might vary motivational level, the in-
tensity and nature of the stimuli, the response required, and so on. The 
problem, of course, is that control by systematic variation can never prove 
that a species difference exists. It is impossible to prove that there are no 
circumstances in which a species will learn a particular type of problem. 
Some untested combination of variables may produce positive results in 
the future. 
This leaves a curious asymmetry in the interpretation of compara-
tive-learning research. The meaning of similar results with different 
species is supposedly clear: the species do not differ in the learning abil-
ity being tested. The meaning of different results with different species 
is never clear. No matter how many failed attempts there have been, the 
skeptic can always claim, with impeccable logic, that the apparent dif-
ference may be due to something other than a species difference in 
learning abilities. 
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"MECHANISMS" OF LEARNING 
The second problem that presents substantial challenges to the com-
parative analysis of intelligence is the logical status of what are com-
monly called the "mechanisms" of learning. In normal language a 
mechanism is machinery, like gears in a clock. The machinery is phys-
ical and can be observed directly. In comparative anatomy and physi-
ology the mechanisms are also physical; respiration has a physically ob-
servable and measurable basis in trachea, lungs, and hemoglobin. In 
principle, learning mechanisms also have a physical basis in the brain. 
But that physical basis is as yet unknown in any detail, especially for more 
complex forms of learning. In any case, the way psychologists define 
learning (or cognitive) mechanisms is independent of the physical basis 
of these mechanisms. 
The "mechanisms" of learning are known in terms of input-output 
relationships. That is, models are constructed that accurately predict 
output, behavior, from the input, previous experience. A successful 
model is then called a learning mechanism. The things we call learning 
mechanisms are not really mechanisms at all but hypothetical con-
structs, models that accurately predict behavior. What does it mean to 
say that the same hypothetical construct correctly predicts learning in 
two different species? 
It certainly does not mean that the mechanisms of learning, in the 
physical sense, are identical in the two species. It is instructive, in this 
context, to look at an example from comparative physiology. There is 
considerable variety in the physical mechanisms of respiration, even 
among air-breathing vertebrates. The mechanisms (e.g., the lungs) are 
not inferred, they are directly observable. It is hard to imagine compar-
ative physiologists arguing much about whether the differences be-
tween bird and mammal lungs are quantitative or qualitative, or wheth-
er we should use one mathematical model with changeable parameters 
or two different mathematical models. The differences are there to be 
directly observed and measured. In other words, some of the argu-
ments about comparative interpretation of possible species differences 
in learning have their origin in the hypothetical nature of learning 
"mechanisms," not in the logic of comparative analysis per se. 
Given the hypothetical nature of mechanisms of animal learning or 
intelligence, one of the central arguments of the traditional approach, 
that of qualitative versus quantitative differences, will often be impos-
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sible to resolve, and it misses the point in any case. For example, con-
sider the argument over long-delay taste-aversion learning. Baron, 
Kaufman, and Fazzini (1969) have shown that as the delay between a 
bar press and a shock increases from 0 to 60 sec, the extent of suppres-
sion of bar pressing decreases. Andrews and Braveman (1975) have 
shown that as the delay between saccharin consumption and poisoning 
increases from a few minutes to 25 hours, the suppression of saccharin 
intake decreases. In describing these results, Mazur (1986) concludes that 
they "do not require the postulation of a different law to replace the 
principle of contiguity; they merely require the use of different numbers 
in describing the relationship between contiguity and learning" (p. 228). 
Although this statement is literally true-a single model can describe 
both sets of results with a change in parameter value-what does the 
word "merely" imply? 
Clearly, it implies that the difference is "only" quantitative and 
therefore not of much interest (to Mazur). But how large does a quan-
titative difference have to be before it can escape the description "mere-
ly"? A difference between seconds and hours is a difference of more than 
a thousandfold. As Bolles (1985a) points out, a thousandfold difference 
in a biological system is never just quantitative. One can find 
on the skeletons of some snakes little bumps on certain vertebrae 
where the legs might be if the snake had legs. They are pelvic 
bumps, and it is my understanding that these bumps may be 1 or 
2 mm in size ... although a 1- or 2-mm leg is not much of a leg, it 
is actually about 1I1000th of the length of the legs of a race horse. 
So the difference in legs between a snake and a race horse is really 
only a matter of degree. (p. 393) 
From a biological point of view, it does not matter whether one chooses 
to call the differences between taste-aversion learning and bar-press 
suppression qualitative or quantitative. The difference can be account-
ed for by postulating a single "mechanism" with a parameter or two 
whose values can be changed to accommodate the temporal differ-
ences. It can also be accounted for by postulating two "mechanisms." 
What matters is that there are differences, and these raise a large num-
ber of issues that need empirical attention. Since these issues are pri-
marily evolutionary and functional in nature, the traditional approach 
is not likely to pursue them. 
An analogy that may be useful in thinking about this problem is to 
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compare learning mechanisms to computer programs. Suppose one were 
given two programs that solved arithmetic problems in compiled form, 
so that the programs could not be listed. How would one go about de-
termining whether these programs were based on the same underlying 
algorithms? One would have to study the input-output relationships-
give each program a set of standard problems and compare the speed 
and accuracy with which they solved the different problems. If the re-
sults for both programs were identical, it would seem highly likely that 
the programs were the same, although one could not be positive. Per-
haps some other arithmetic test would produce results that were differ-
ent for the two programs. 
What would happen if the programs differed in some systematic way? 
For example, suppose that one program always took longer than the 
other, but only when division was involved. One would naturally be led 
to conclude that the programs used different algorithms for division. But 
wait! A theorist could claim that the difference was only quantitative-
perhaps the slower program used the same algorithm but had a pause 
statement added to its division subroutine. 
No analogy should be pushed too far. But my general point is that it 
would be very hard to know with certainty whether the two programs 
used the same algorithm. Furthermore, it would probably be impossible 
to tell the "evolutionary" relationship between the programs-whether 
they had been independently written or one had led to the other. This, 
of course, is the problem of homology versus analogy in the evolution-
ary study of traits. 
There is one final point to milk from this analogy. One approach to 
the problem of comparing the two programs would be to attempt meas-
urement at the molecular level and measure the activities of the micro-
processor itself. Thinking about this brings out some interesting impli-
cations for the relationship between behavioral mechanisms and the 
physical processes instantiating them. At one level the mechanism for 
the two programs would be identical-the same processor, and so on, 
would be involved, even if the programs were written in different lan-
guages. But I am sure suitable measurements could be made that would 
reveal any difference. This suggests that knowledge of the events in the 
central nervous system that underlie the intellectual capacities of ani-
mals will be useful in understanding these processes. But it will have to 
be information of a certain type. I suspect it will be a long time before 
the neuroanatomy and neurophysiology underlying the complex pro-
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cesses involved in animal intelligence are understood at all. Behavioral 
work needs to proceed. The issues are too important to wait on the as-
sumption that the physiological level of analysis will eventually solve 
these problems. In addition, without good understanding of the way 
mental processes function at the behavioral level, it is unlikely that 
phYSiological work can succeed (Kamil, 1987). 
The N ull Hypothesis 
Many of the problems that the traditional approach encounters in the 
comparative realm can be seen quite clearly by examining the methods 
and conclusions of Macphail (1982, 1985), who conducted an extensive 
critical survey of the literature on the comparative study of learning in 
vertebrates. His conclusion was that there was no compelling reason to 
reject the null hypothesis "that there are no differences, either quanti-
tative or qualitative, among the mechanisms of intelligence of non-hu-
man vertebrates" (Macphail, 1982, p. 330), and he has reaffirmed this 
more recently (1985). How does Macphail reach this conclusion? 
One approach to this question would be to take each of the phenom-
ena Macphail examined and decide how plausible his conclusions are. 
However, that would probably take a book as long as his. In any event, 
I want to raise a more crucial point. Does Macphail's basic approach to 
the comparative study of vertebrate intelligence have some basic flaw 
(or flaws) that calls his conclusion into question? One can argue that his 
logic forced the final conclusion. 
The first problem with Macphail's analysis is his definition of intel-
ligence. In his opening chapter, he avoids any explicit definition. In par-
ticular, he states that it would be best to leave open the question "whether 
intelligence is some unitary capacity, or better seen as a complex of ca-
pacities, each of which might be independent of the others" (1982, p. 4). 
Macphail says that a decision about this issue might bias his review. 
However, his review is in fact biased toward the unitary view. For ex-
ample, in discussing the results of a comparative research program on 
reversal learning in birds conducted by Gossette and his associates 
(Gossette, 1967; Gossette, Gossette, & Inman, 1966), Macphail dismiss-
es their findings. The reason for the dismissal is that different patterns 
of reversal learning between species were found with spatial and non-
spatial cues. Macphail states, "If the ordering of species in serial rever-
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sal performance can be changed by altering the relevant dimension, it 
seems clear that serial reversal in itself cannot give a reliable measure of 
general intelligence" (Macphail, 1982, p. 223) In the concluding discus-
sion of his last chapter, Macphail talks extensively in terms of general 
in telligence. 
A second contributor to Macphail's conclusion is an extreme willing-
ness to believe in the untested intellectual capacities of animals. If some 
apparently complex learning ability has been demonstrated in two dis-
tantly related species, Macphail is willing to assllme it can be found in 
all species. For example, win-stay, lose-shift learning in object-discrim-
ination learning set is best tested by looking for transfer from object-re-
versallearning to learning set. This phenomenon has been demonstrat-
ed in relatively few species (blue jays-Kamil, Jones, Pietrewicz, & 
Mauldin, 1977; rhesus monkeys-Warren, 1966; chimpanzees-Schus-
terman, 1962), and tests for such transfer have failed in at least two cases 
(cats-Warren, 1966; squirrel monkeys-Ricciardi & Treichler, 1970). The 
failure with cats is dismissed as apparently due to contextual variables, 
the failure with squirrel monkeys is not cited. The major implication of 
the discussion is that though most species have not been tested, they 
would show the phenomenon. 
Another, perhaps more egregious example, is drawn from Mac-
phail's (1985) discussion of languagelike behavior. Such behavior has 
been demonstrated in some primates using sign language or artificial 
language (e.g., Gardner & Gardner, 1969; Rumbaugh, 1977). Pepper-
berg (1981, 1983) has recently demonstrated similar behavior in an Af-
rican gray parrot using "speech." Although the parrot has not achieved 
the level of performance shown by the primates (at least not yet), he has 
demonstrated capacities beyond what anyone (except Pepperberg) might 
have expected. Macphail (1985) concludes by saying, "As the single avi-
an subject yet exposed to an appropriate training schedule, he [the par-
rot] gives good support to the view that the parrot's talent for language 
acquisition may not be significantly different from the ape's" (Macphail, 
1985, p. 48). Macphail seems to be implying that the same would be true 
of every vertebrate species if only suitable testing procedures could be 
devised. This exceptional willingness to assume that species possess 
abilities for which they have not even been tested stands in marked con-
trast to Macphail's extreme unwillingness to accept apparent species 
differences that have been revealed. 
The most important reason for Macphail's conclusion of no species 
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differences among vertebrates in learning or intelligence is his extensive 
use of the contextual stimulus argument (Bitterman, 1960, 1965). As dis-
cussed above, whenever an explicit comparison of two species in the 
same learning task turns up differences, one can always argue that they 
reflect some performance factor (the effects of a contextual variable) 
rather than a difference in intelligence. Proving that there is no set of 
circumstances in which an animal can learn a particular task (e.g., that 
frogs cannot acquire language-like behavior) is impossible. 
Thus Macphail's argument leaves us with two competing null hy-
potheses. One is the null hypothesis of no differences in intelligence 
among vertebrates. Macphail holds that this null hypothesis should be 
maintained unless clear, convincing evidence against it is obtained. But 
clear convincing evidence must prove the second null hypothesis that 
no contextual variable is responsible for the proposed species differ-
ences. This logic essentially makes it impossible ever to demonstrate that 
there are species differences in intelligence. 
Macphail would probably say I have overstated his argument. He does 
not require absolute proof of the second null hypothesis through sys-
tematic variation, only some reasonable attempt at evaluating contex-
tual variables. But who is to determine what constitutes reasonable? In 
fact, the problem of contextual variables can never be completely dealt 
with through control by systematic variation. 
Macphail has performed a valuable service. His arguments have 
clearly demonstrated that the traditional approach to the comparative 
study of learning can never succeed. One can never be certain that a 
species lacks a particular learning ability. This lesson applies not just to 
the study of learning, narrowly defined, but to the study of animal in-
telligence in general. An alternative approach that avoids the problem 
of contextual variables must be found. As described later in this chapter, 
there are compelling biological reasons to believe that species differ-
ences in intelligence do exist. Given that Macphail's approach can never 
successfully demonstrate such differences, it is crucial to find an alter-
native approach that avoids the problem of contextual variables. 
The Synthetic Approach to Animal Intelligence 
In this section I will outline an alternative approach to the study of the 
mental capacities of animals. I have labeled this the synthetic approach 
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because it represents an attempt to synthesize the approaches of psy-
chologists and organismic biologists. The synthetic approach has three 
major aspects: (1) a broad definition of the phenomena of interest; (2) a 
comparative, evolutionary orientation; which leads to (3) an emphasis 
upon the importance of studying learning and its effects both in the lab-
oratory and in the natural environment of the species being studied. 
BROAD DEFINITION OF THE 
PHENOMENA OF INTEREST 
Using the term animal intelligence is a calculated gamble. It has the sub-
stantial advantages of communicating the general topic of interest to a 
wide audience in many different fields and of emphasizing the broad 
range of phenomena to be included. But it also carries a substantial dis-
advantage. It is a term that has been used and abused in many ways in 
the past. When technical discussion begins, then, there is a risk of mis-
understanding based on people's assuming different definitions of an-
imal intelligence. 
I want to be explicit about the definition of animal intelligence I am 
using. The synthetic approach defines animal intelligence as those proc-
esses by which animals obtain and retain information about their envi-
ronments and use that information to make behavioral decisions. Sev-
eral characteristics of this definition need to be emphasized. 
First of all, this is a broad definition. It includes all processes that are 
involved in any situation where animals change their behavior on the 
basis of experience. It encompasses the processes studied with tradi-
tional methods such as operant and classical conditioning. It also in-
cludes processes such as memory and selective attention, which animal 
cognitive psychologists study (Roitblat, 1986). It includes processes in-
volved in complex learning of all sorts, including that demonstrated in 
social situations. It also includes the study of more "specialized" learn-
ing, such as song learning and imprinting. 
Second, the definition emphasizes the information-processing and 
decision-making view of animals. This makes it very consistent with the 
approach of animal cognitive psychologists. It also makes the synthetic 
approach consistent with behavioral ecology (Krebs & Davies, 1978, 
1984), which emphasizes the adaptive significance of the behavioral de-
cisions of animals. 
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Third, this definition assumes that animal intelligence is multidi-
mensional, not unidimensional, in accordance with recent thinking about 
human intelligence (Gardner, 1982). It also prohibits any simple order-
ing of species in terms of general intelligence. Species that are very good 
at some problems may be bad at others. 
Fourth, this definition offers the possibility of conceptually integrat-
ing environmental and genetic influences on behavior, thus avoiding the 
nature/nurture controversy. It is generally recognized that no behavior 
is determined completely by either genetic or environmental variables 
alone. However, this realization does not seem to have had much effect 
on animal learning research in psychology, which still tends to ignore 
the idea that the learning abilities of animals are part of their biological 
heritage. The synthetic approach regards learned behavior as the result 
of experience. But these effects of experience are determined by the in-
tellectual capacities of the organism, which in turn depend upon the 
expression of genetically and ontogenetically determined abilities. 
This focus on processes instantiating behavior obviously entails re-
jecting most types of behaviorism, but not methodological behaviorism. 
The primary way to learn about these processes is by studying behavior. 
There is no desire to throwaway the considerable methodological so-
phistication that has been developed over the past century, only to re-
direct that sophistication. 
COMPARATIVE, EVOLUTIONARY ORIENTATION 
There has been considerable disagreement and confusion about the im-
portance, role, and purpose of comparative research on animal learn-
ing. Some have viewed animal learning research as primarily a way of 
understanding basic mechanisms that would, at least in the long run, 
lead to fuller (or even complete) understanding of our own species. For 
these scientists, comparative research has been relatively unimportant. 
Others have viewed comparative research as important but have adopt-
ed approaches in conflict with evolutionary theory (Hodos & Campbell, 
1969). For example, Yarczower and Hazlett (1977) have argued in favor 
of anagenesis, the linear ranking of species on a trait. But given the com-
plexity of relationships among existing species, it is hard to see how such 
linear ranking would be useful, though it is possible. 
The synthetic approach adopts a view of comparative research on an-
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imal intelligence that is based upon modern evolutionary theory. The 
essence of the approach is to assume that the various processes com-
posing animal intelligence have adaptive effects and to use this as-
sumption as a starting point for research, particularly comparative work. 
In this framework the goal of research is to develop a full understanding 
of animal intelligence at all relevant levels of explanation, including de-
velopmental, mechanistic, physiological, phylogenetic, and ecological 
levels. For comparative work, this sets the goal of understanding pat-
terns of similarities and differences among species. The evolutionary 
framework offers several new research strategies for the study of animal 
intelligence, discussed in the last section of this chapter. 
One important implication of the synthetic approach is that both 
qualitative and quantitative differences between species are of interest. 
This is important for two reasons. First, the distinction between quali-
tative and quantitative differences is often a matter of individual judg-
ment. Second, examining the comparative study of morphological traits 
clearly shows that the distinction between qualitative and quantitative 
differences is blurred. Understanding qualitative differences, particu-
larly the relationship between qualitative differences and the ecology of 
the species in question, is a crucial part of developing a full understand-
ing of the phenomena of interest. 
For example, consider once more the comparative physiology of res-
piration. Those writing about the comparative study of learning often 
use respiration, or some other physiological system, as an analogy that 
may offer some guidance (e.g., Bolles, 1985a; Revusky, 1985). At some 
levels the respiratory system is the same in a wide variety of animals. 
For example, fish, amphibians, reptiles, birds, and mammals all use 
various hemoglobins to bind oxygen and transport it through the cir-
culatory system. But at other levels respiratory systems differ dramati-
cally. Many amphibians utilize a positive-pressure ventilation system to 
move air through the lungs. Mammals utilize negative-pressure venti-
lation in which pressure in the thoracic cavity is slightly lower than at-
mospheric pressure. Birds, in contrast, have a flow-through lung ven-
tilation system that requires two respiratory cycles for the complete 
passage of a breath of air. These differences are related to various eco-
logical correlates of the different niches of these organisms (Hains-
worth, 1981). Revusky (1985) uses the analogy between learning and 
respiration to argue for the existence of a generalleaming process. But 
the substantial variation in the respiratory systems of different animals 
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can be used to reach another conclusion: that full understanding re-
quires the analysis of differences among species as well as similarities. 
THE EMPHASIS ON BOTH LABORATORY AND FIELD 
Because the synthetic approach is evolutionary in orientation, it neces-
sarily views events in the field, under natural conditions, as crucial. That 
is, it is assumed that the intellectual capacities of animals serve impor-
tant biological, adaptive functions. Therefore studies of learning, mem-
ory, and so on, under natural conditions can throw considerable light 
upon animal intelligence. In most cases coordinated laboratory and na-
turalistic research will be the most informative. 
This coordinated approach to laboratory and field research on animal 
intelligence is important for two reasons. First, it addresses the problem 
of external validity raised earlier. If the principles of animal intelligence 
derived from laboratory research prove useful in the field, this will in-
crease our confidence that important mechanisms of animal behavior 
have been successfully identified. Second, it is important for theoretical 
reasons. Since the synthetic approach depends heavily on identifying 
the specific ways animal intelligence affects biological success, field re-
search will be necessary. These issues will permeate the rest of this 
chapter. 
THE PLACE OF GENERAL PROCESSES IN THE 
SYNTHETIC APPROACH 
The emphasis on general learning processes has been so pervasive that 
explicit discussion of their place in the synthetic approach could be val-
uable. Two extreme views about general processes can be identified 
(Bitterman, 1975). The extreme general process view is that a single gen-
eral process is responsible for all learning. The extreme antigeneral 
process view, perhaps best exemplified by Lockard (1971), holds that 
there is no generality, that learning in each species is unique. 
The synthetic approach views both these positions as too extreme. 
On the one hand the available evidence, especially the research of Bit-
terman and his colleagues with honeybees (e.g., Abramson & Bitter-
man, 1986; Bitterman, Menzel, Fietz, & Schafer, 1983; Couvillon & Bit-
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terman, 1984) clearly demonstrates impressive similarity in basic 
associative learning among diverse species. On the other hand, the 
demonstration of a general learning process present in many species does 
not rule out the possibility of important, significant species differences, 
both qualitative and quantitative. 
Assume that animals use a host of processes to obtain environmental 
information and that some of these are quite general across species, oth-
ers widespread but less general, and others very limited in distribution. 
A research program based upon the assumption of general processes 
would appear successful-general processes would be found. How-
ever, the less general processes would remain undiscovered. Further-
more, and more important for any comparative, evolutionary study of 
animal intelligence, differences among species and the adaptive role of 
cognitive processes outside the laboratory would remain unknown. 
Argumen ts for Increased Breadth 
The synthetic approach calls for two broad changes in the traditional 
psychological approach to animal learning: increasing the breadth of 
phenomena being studied, and placing these phenomena in an evolu-
tionary, ecological framework. In this section I will present the argu-
ments for increased breadth. 
COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN ANIMALS 
Perhaps the greatest challenge to the traditional approach from within 
psychology has been the emergence of the cognitive approach to animal 
learning. This development has been thoroughly documented in a 
number of publications (Hulse et al., 1978; Riley, Brown, & Yoerg, 1986; 
Roitblat, 1986; Roitblat et al., 1984). The cognitive approach emphasizes 
the internal states and processes of animals. 
Organisms are assumed to have internal cognitive structures that de-
pend on their individual development as well as their evolution. Exter-
nal objects cannot enter directly into an organism's cognitive system, and 
so they must be internally encoded-that is, "represented." Accord-
ingly, much cognitive research involves techniques for studying the 
representations used by an organism, the processes that produce, 
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maintain, and operate on them, and the environmental and situational 
factors that affect them (Roitblat et al., 1984, p. 2). 
One important area of cognitive research focuses upon the "memory 
codes" animals use. For example, in a symbolic matching-to-sample task, 
the animal is first presented briefly with a single stimulus, the sample. 
Then it is presented with an array of test stimuli. Choice of one of the 
test stimuli will be reinforced. Which stimulus is correct depends upon 
which sample stimulus was previously presented. There are at least two 
ways the animal could code the sample information: retrospectively, by 
remembering the sample itself, or prospectively, by remembering which 
test stimulus would be correct. Roitblat (1980) found that errors tended 
to be directed toward test stimuli resembling the to-be-correct test stim-
ulus, implying a prospective code. Cook, Brown, and Riley (1985) have 
obtained data in the radial maze implying that rats use both retrospec-
tive and prospective memory in this spatial task. 
Another cognitive issue that has received a great deal of attention is 
animals' ability to time the duration of events. One procedure that has 
been used to study timing is the "peak procedure" of Roberts (1981). On 
most trials, rats receive food for bar pressing after a signal has been pres-
ent for a fixed duration. On occasional probe trials, the Signal remains 
on for a much longer period. When the rate of bar pressing on these probe 
trials is analyzed as a function of time into the trial, the response rate is 
highest at that point in time when food is usually presented on non-
probe trials. The process underlying this ability to gauge time appears 
to have many of the properties of a stopwatch. For example, the clock 
can be stopped or reset (Roberts, 1983). 
Another cognitive ability that has been extensively studied is count-
ing. The major methodological problem facing research on counting, or 
sensitivity to numerosity, is how to demonstrate that behavior can be 
brought under the discriminative control of number and not any of the 
many other attributes that may correlate with number. Although not 
every study has addressed this problem, it has long been recognized 
(Koehler, 1950; Thorpe, 1956). Fernandes and Church (1982) presented 
rats with sequences of either two or four short sounds. If there were two 
sounds, the rat was reinforced for pressing a lever on the right. If there 
were four sounds, the rat was reinforced for pressing the lever on the 
left. Not only did the rats perform accurately, but they maintained this 
accuracy when nonnumerical aspects of the sequences, such as stimu-
lus duration and interstimulus intervals, were varied. 
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Davis and Memmott (1983) demonstrated sensitivity to sequentially 
presented stimuli with a much different procedure. Rats were trained 
to respond on a variable-interval food reinforcement schedule until they 
were responding steadily. They were then exposed to three unsignaled 
shocks during each session. Responding was initially suppressed, but 
after some time responding accelerated after the third shock, even 
though there was considerable variation in when during the session the 
shocks could occur. For example, in control sessions in which there were 
only two shocks, one early and one late, there was no acceleration of re-
sponding after the second shock, which came near the end of the ses-
sion. 
The existence of cognitive abilities such as counting, timing, and 
memory coding clearly challenge the traditional approach, especially 
radical behaviorism. The nature and implications of this challenge have 
been discussed in many places in the literature (e.g., Roitblat, 1982, and 
replies; Riley et al., 1986). The cognitive approach is an alternative re-
search program to radical behaviorism and also can be claimed to in-
clude associationism, since modern theories of association are very cog-
nitive in nature. Furthermore, as I will discuss below, the various aspects 
of the cognitive approach fit very well with the synthetic approach, par-
ticularly when it comes to comparative, evolutionary issues. 
COMPLEX LEARNING IN ANIMALS 
The cognitive approach has begun to emphasize more complex forms of 
animal learning, but many examples of research on complex learning re-
main to be integrated within the cognitive approach. In some cases these 
areas of research predate the emergence of the cognitive approach by 
many years. 
One clear example of this is provided by the literature on object-dis-
crimination learning set (Bessemer & Stollnitz, 1971). In an object-dis-
crimination learning set (ODLS) experiment, animals are given a series 
of discrimination problems to solve. Each problem is defined by the in-
troduction of a new pair of stimuli, one arbitrarily designated as correct. 
Of main interest is an improvement in the speed of learning new prob-
lems, especially above chance choice on the second trial of new prob-
lems. Many primate species (Bessemer & Stollnitz, 1971), as well as sev-
eral avian species (Hunter & Kamil, 1971; Kamil & Hunter, 1969), have 
280 
NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 1987 
been shown to reach high levels of performance on the second trial of 
new problems. 
The model that best accounts for ODLS performance in primates is a 
cognitive model. The basic idea is that the animals learn a pattern of 
choices descriptively labeled "win-stay, lose-shift." That is, on Trial 2 of 
a new problem, they remember two aspects of what happened on Trial 
1: which stimulus was chosen and whether they received reinforce-
ment. Then if they remember reinforcement (win) on Trial 1, they choose 
the same stimulus on Trial 2. If they remember nonreinforcement (lose) 
on Trial 1, they shift their choice on Trial 2. The results of many exper-
iments on long-term and short-term memory, on the effects of switch-
ing stimuli between Trials 1 and 2, of positive transfer from reversal 
learning to ODLS, and of stimulus preferences on Trial 1 are all consis-
tent with this model. 
Despite this impressive literature, the ODLS phenomenon has been 
largely ignored by those working on animal learning. It apparently lies 
outside the realm of phenomena traditional workers are willing to con-
sider. Given the apparent involvement of long- and short-term memo-
ry, and strategy learning, it is particularly surprising that animal cog-
nitive psychologists have ignored ODLS. 
There are many other examples of complex learning in animals that 
are generally ignored, in the sense that no consistent attempt has been 
made to integrate these phenomena into a systematic cognitive-based 
scheme. These include evidence for categorical learning by pigeons 
(Herrnstein, 1985), detailed spatial representational systems in a variety 
of organisms (bees-Gould, 1987; primates-Menzel & Juno, 1982, 1985), 
and various forms of reasoning in chimpanzees (Gillan, Pre mack, & 
Woodruff,1981). 
These phenomena suggest that the cognitive approach needs to be 
expanded. At least to an outsider like me, it appears that many of the 
issues of central concern for animal cognitive psychologists originate in 
procedures used in the past. A good example of this point is provided 
by research on selective attention in animals. Some psychological work 
on selective attention has attempted to determine whether attention 
could account for certain phenomena such as reversal learning (Bitter-
man, 1969; Mackintosh, 1969). Other research has attempted to dem-
onstrate attention to abstract dimensions, such as color or line orienta-
tion in matching to sample tasks (e.g., Zentall, Hogan, & Edwards, 1984). 
These types of research are very different and perhaps in the long run 
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less informative than direct attempts to study selective attention and its 
characteristics. One area in which selective attention and its effects have 
been examined is research focused upon the detection of cryptic, hard-
to-see prey. Selective attention appears to playa substantial role in prey 
detection (Bond, 1983; Dawkins, 1971a, 1971b; Pietrewicz & Kamil, 1981). 
Animal cognitive psychology needs to broaden its scope and focus more 
directly on the information-handling processes of animals, with less fo-
cus on the particular issues generated by methodological developments 
of the past. The broad definition of intelligence offered by the synthetic 
approach would hasten this process. 
EVIDENCE FROM THE FIELD: SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE 
The emergence of behavioral ecology in the past 20 years has led to a 
dramatic increase in our knowledge of the behavior of individual ani-
mals in the field (see Krebs & Davies, 1978, 1984). This literature con-
tains many examples of data demonstrating that animals know a great 
deal about their environments, especially in two contexts-foraging and 
social behavior. In this section I discuss some of the data on social rela-
tionships. Data on foraging behavior will be reviewed later. 
As I indicated at the very beginning of this chapter, many anecdotes 
based on observations in the field suggest that animals possess consid-
erable knowledge about their world, particularly social interactions. Be-
cause anecdotes have generally been regarded as scientifically unac-
ceptable, they are most often unreported. As Kummer (1982) has 
observed, this is unfortunate. It has left each fieldworker aware only of 
his or her own observations. 
My own experience confirms this. After observing the behavior of 
"Spot" described at the beginning of this chapter, I filed the incident away 
and for a long time never discussed it with anyone. One night, with some 
hesitation, I told the story to a group of fieldworkers. It turned out that 
another hummingbird researcher had seen a similar incident in another 
territorial species. Every fieldworker present that evening had stories that 
suggested animals possess more knowledge of their environment than 
typically considered by the laboratory researcher. 
Although these are only anecdotes and their scientific validity is lim-
ited, it is time to take their implications seriously and begin to design 
experiments to test the implications. For example, Goodall (1986) re-
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ports many observations of the chimpanzees at Gombe that indicate these 
animals are acutely aware of the social relationships of their group. In 
Goodall's terminology, animals manipulate others and assess others' 
interactions. Are there any more systematic data to support these im-
plications? 
Kummer and his associates have tested some of these ideas in their 
research program with hamadryas baboons. Hamadryas baboons have 
a single-male, multiple-female social system in which males "appropri-
ate" females. Kummer, Gotz, and Angst (1974) found that if a male was 
allowed to watch another male with a female, this inhibited the ten-
dency of the observing male to attempt to take over the female, even if 
the observing male was dominant to the other male. Something analo-
gous to a concept of "ownership" appears to be present. 
Even more intriguing, Bachmann and Kummer (1980) found that male 
hamadryas baboons assess the relation between another male and a fe-
male. They tested twelve baboons, six of each sex. In the first stage they 
tested all possible different-sex pairs for grooming preference. This al-
lowed the experimenters to construct a hierarchy of preference of each 
animal for each of the opposite-sexed animals. They then allowed males 
to watch another pair for 15 minutes. At the end of the 15 minute ob-
servation period, they gave the observer a graded set of opportunities 
to attempt to appropriate the female. They found that the observer as-
sessed the relationship between the male and female he had been ob-
serving. The probability of the observer's attempting to appropriate the 
female depended on the female's preference for the original male. If that 
preference was weak, appropriation was more likely. 
The research program of Cheney and Seyfarth is generating similar 
kinds of data for vervet monkeys. Cheney and Seyfarth (1980) conduct-
ed playback experiments in the field during which the scream of a ju-
venile was played through a hidden loudspeaker to groups of females 
that included the juvenile's mother. Mothers responded more strongly 
to these calls than the other females did. More surprisingly, the other 
females often responded by looking at the mother before the mother 
herself had reacted. This indicates that the females recognized the re-
lationships of other females and young. 
More recent data indicate that vervets have knowledge about other 
social relationships. Cheney and Seyfarth (1986) recorded the probabil-
ity of agonistic encounters between members of a vervet group as a 
function of recent social interactions. There were two main findings. 
First, they found that individuals were more likely to behave aggres-
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sively toward other group members who had recently fought with their 
own kin, indicating that they know their own kin. Kin recognition is well 
known in many species. Second, Cheney and Seyfarth found that in-
dividuals were more likely to interact aggressively with others whose 
close kin had recently fought with their own kin. This indicates that 
vervet monkeys know about the relationships of other monkeys in their 
group. This appears to be learned, since monkeys under three years of 
age did not show the effect. How the relationships are learned is un-
known. 
Cheney and Seyfarth (1985) have argued that primate intelligence may 
have evolved primarily to deal with social relationships. Monkeys and 
apes clearly recognize social relationships and remember recent affilia-
tive and aggressive interactions. But when tested for similar nonsocial 
knowledge, the monkeys appear surprisingly unresponsive. In various 
field experiments, vervets failed to respond to signs of predators. Che-
ney and Seyfarth's (1985) argument seems premature because these ex-
periments on nonsocial knowledge may have failed to produce positive 
results for many reasons other than the monkeys' lack of knowledge. 
Nonetheless, their more general point about the importance of cogni-
tion in social settings deserves careful attention, not only in primates but 
in many group-living animals. 
CONCL USIONS 
It is clear that a trend toward studying more complex forms of animal 
learning is well under way. It is important that this trend continue. Many 
unanticipated intellectual abilities have been revealed, and this implies 
that there are more waiting to be discovered. 
Griffin (1976, 1978) has argued that interspecies communication of-
fers an important tool for investigating the knowledge animals possess 
about their world. This is certainly true, and it is encouraging to see the 
technique being used with more species, including not only apes (Sav-
age-Rumbaugh, this volume) but birds (Pepperberg, 1981, 1983), dol-
phins (Herman, Wolz, & Richards, 1984), and sea lions (Schusterman & 
Krieger, 1986). 
There are two general suggestions about how this search for complex 
processes in animals should proceed that I would like to make at this 
point. First, some research should concentrate primarily on what ani-
mals know, without worrying too much, for the time being, about how 
284 
NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 1987 
they acquire the knowledge. For example, the research of Premack and 
his associates with Sarah, a chimpanzee trained to use plastic symbols 
as a medium for communication, indicates that Sarah understands many 
relationships among stimuli. Although this research tells us little about 
how Sarah acquired this knowledge, it begins to tell us some of the things 
any complete theory of animal intelligence will have to be able to ex-
plain. 
Second, it is important to continue to test animals in relatively un-
constrained situations. It is quite possible that by restricting attention to 
experimental situations in which animals had few response alternatives 
and had to deal only with a few simple stimuli, psychologists have 
underestimated the abilities of their subjects. For example, the research 
of Menzel and Juno (1982, 1985) has demonstrated one-trial discrimi-
nation learning and extensive long-term memory for the spatial location 
of many objects in group-living marmosets, in marked contrast to the 
relatively poor performance of marmosets in more traditional experi-
mental settings (e.g., Miles & Meyer, 1956). The distinguishing features 
of the procedures of Menzel and Juno (1982, 1985) were probably the lack 
of constraints on the behavior of the marmosets and the use of knowl-
edge about the natural foraging environment of these marmosets in de-
signing the problems. These two characteristics were probably crucial 
to making it possible for the animals to demonstrate what they knew 
about their environment. 
Arguments for a More Biological Approach 
In this section I will review three areas of research-biological con-
straints on learning, "specialized" learning, and learning under natural 
conditions. The results of research in these three areas, considered to-
gether, provide convincing evidence that learning must be considered 
in a biolOgical, evolutionary framework. 
BIOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS ON LEARNING 
The phenomena that are usually called biological constraints on learn-
ing indicate the intrusion of biological factors into standard, traditional 
conditioning situations. Breland and Breland (1961) were the first to rec-
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ognize the importance of constraints in operant-conditioning situa-
tions. They observed what they called instinctive drift, a tendency for 
"natural behaviors" of animals undergoing operant conditioning to in-
trude upon and interfere with the emission of the response being rein-
forced. The Brelands clearly recognized the fundamental importance of 
their observations, which they viewed as a "demonstration that there 
are definite weaknesses in the philosophy underlying these [condition-
ing] techniques" (Breland & Breland, 1961, p. 684). However, their find-
ings had little effect at the time. The later discoveries of taste-aversion 
learning, auto shaping, and species-specific defense reactions had more 
impact. 
Taste-aversion learning was first reported by Garcia and Koelling 
(1966). In essence, taste-aversion learning suggests that some stimuli are 
more associable than others, challenging the often implicit assumption 
of associationists that stimuli are generally equipotential (Seligman, 
1970). These studies show that many animals are more likely to associ-
ate intestinal illness with gustatory (or olfactory) stimuli than with ex-
ternal stimuli. Garcia and Koelling (1966) proposed that these results 
demonstrate that rats may have a genetically coded hypothesis: "The 
hypothesis of the sick rat, as for many of us under similar circumstan-
ces, would be, 'it must have been something I ate.'" (Garcia & Koelling, 
1966, p. 124). 
The phenomenon of autoshaping was first reported by Brown and 
Jenkins (1968). Brown and Jenkins found that if they simply illuminated 
a light behind a pecking key for a few seconds, then presented food, the 
pigeons began to peck the key even though these pecks had no effect on 
the presentation of the reinforcer. Although they felt that an appeal to 
some species-specific disposition was necessary, and though Breland and 
Breland reported many similar findings in less constrained situations, 
Brown and Jenkins do not cite the Brelands. The implication that spe-
cies-specific predispositions affect the key peck has been confirmed. 
Jenkins and Moore (1973) showed that the topography of the pigeon's 
key peck depends on the reinforcer used. Mauldin (1981; Kamil & Maul-
din, 1987) found that three different passerine species each used spe-
cies-specific response topologies in an autoshaping situation. 
The concept of species-specific defense reactions originated in a sem-
inal paper by Bolles (1970). Bolles argued that many of the results of 
avoidance-conditioning experiments could best be understood in terms 
of the innate species-specific responses of the species being tested, such 
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as fighting and fleeing. The opening sentence of his abstract was, "The 
prevailing theories of avoidance learning and the procedures that are 
usually used to study it seem to be totally out of touch with what is known 
about how animals defend themselves in nature" (Bolles, 1970, p. 32). 
I have been brief in describing these developments because there are 
already so many extensive reviews of biological constraints available in 
the literature (e.g., Seligman & Hager, 1972; Hinde & Stevenson-Hinde, 
1973). And there is still considerable controversy about the extent to 
which these phenomena require abandoning any of the central assump-
tions of the traditional approach. For example, Revusky (1985) argues 
against radical behaviorism but also contends that taste-aversion learn-
ing can be encompassed in a general associationist approach (see be-
low). 
There can be no doubt that these "biological constraints" on learning 
demonstrate that the evolutionary history of the species being studied 
can affect the outcome of a conditioning experiment. Whether the dif-
ferences between taste-aversion learning and other aversive condition-
ing are considered qualitative or quantitative, differences that seem most 
explicable on functional grounds do exist. The form of the response in 
a Skinner box depends on the natural repertoire of the animal, as do the 
results of avoidance-learning experiments. However, the impact of these 
findings on the psychological study of animal learning has been limited. 
The very label given to these phenomena, biological constraints on 
learning, reveals this limited impact. The label implies that there is some 
general process, learning, that is occasionally constrained by the biolo-
gy of the organism (Kamil & Yoerg, 1982). Surely a broader view is jus-
tified. The animal comes to the learning situation with a set of abilities 
that determine what behavioral changes will occur. These abilities are 
part of the animal's biological endowment. (I do not imply that they are 
completely genetically determined-clearly ontogenetic factors play an 
important role.) In that case a functional, evolutionary approach is nec-
essary. 
"SPECIALIZED" LEARNING 
The value of a functional approach to the study of learning can be seen 
clearly in the literature on specialized learning. Specialized learning ap-
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pears in specific biological contexts and plays very specific roles. Ex-
amples include song learning, imprinting, and homing/migration. In 
each of these cases, available data demonstrate that the phenomena in 
question meet any reasonable definition of learning-changes in be-
havior based on experience. The data also show important species dif-
ferences in learning, which can often be related to differences in the nat-
ural history of species. 
Naturalistic studies of nest and egg recognition by gulls and terns 
suggest the existence of important differences in learning among closely 
related species that correlate meaningfully with natural history (Shet-
tleworth, 1984). Royal terns nest in dense colonies where it is difficult 
to discriminate among nest sites. Their eggs are highly variable in ap-
pearance, and they learn to recognize their own eggs. Herring gulls build 
elaborate nests that are spaced farther apart, and they learn to recognize 
their nests but not their eggs. By the time the chicks are old enough to 
wander from the nest, the parents have learned to recognize them (Tin-
bergen, 1953). Yet another pattern is shown by kittiwakes. These birds 
nest on cliff ledges, and their chicks do not (cannot) wander from the 
nest site. Parent kittiwakes recognize only their nest sites and do not 
discriminate their own eggs or young from those of others (Cullen, 1957). 
As Shettleworth (1984) has pointed out, these kinds of differences do 
not necessarily result from differences in learning ability. It may be that 
all the species have the same ability to learn to recognize their eggs, 
young, and nest sites, but natural circumstances of the species vary so 
as to favor one type of learning. For example, kittiwakes might learn to 
recognize their eggs if their eggs varied as much in appearance as do 
those of royal terns. The necessary experiments, such as placing eggs 
that vary in appearance in kittiwake nests, have not been carried out. 
However, this consideration does not apply to all examples of special-
ized learning. 
In the case of song learning, at least some of the necessary experi-
ments exploring differences in learning abilities have been done. Many 
male passerine birds sing songs that function both to attract a mate and 
to defend a territory against other males (Kroodsma, 1982). In many 
species these songs are acquired through experience. Chaffinches, marsh 
wrens, white-crowned sparrows, and many other species must hear 
adult song when young to sing appropriately when mature. In many 
cases there are "dialects" of birdsong-different versions are observed 
288 
NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 1987 
in the same species in different geographical areas. The dialect an adult 
male sings often depends upon which dialect he heard during devel-
opment. 
The findings of Kroodsma and his associates on differences in song 
learning between eastern and western marsh wrens (currently classi-
fied as two subspecies) provide particularly clear evidence on differ-
ences in song learning between these two populations of marsh wrens. 
Kroodsma and Verner (1987) found that the normal repertoire size-the 
number of different songs sung by a single individual-varied consid-
erably between the two populations. Eastern birds had repertoire sizes 
of about 30-60 songs while western birds had repertoire sizes of 120-
220. While this could represent a difference in learning ability, it could 
also be the result of differences in early experience. It seems likely that 
the eastern wrens hear fewer songs when young than do western birds. 
Kroodsma and Canady (1985) have performed the experiment nec-
essary to distinguish between these possibilities. They raised eastern and 
western marsh wrens in identical laboratory environments. All subjects 
heard 200 tutor songs during development. Eastern birds learned 34-64 
different songs, while the western wrens learned 90-113 songs under 
identical conditions. Furthermore, Kroodsma and Canady (1985) found 
significant differences in the size of the song-control nuclei in the brains 
of the two groups. Eastern birds had smaller song-control areas. The 
differences in song learning ability and neuroanatomy appear to be as-
sociated with several ecological differences between the populations, 
including year-round residency and high population densities in the 
western population. 
Thus the evidence on song learning among passerine birds clearly 
demonstrates that species differences in ability exist. Many such differ-
ences are known, and they appear to correlate with natural history and 
ecology (Kroodsma, 1983; West & King, 1985). The finding that two sub-
species of wrens learn different things from the same experience is par-
ticularly noteworthy. There can be important differences in specialized 
learning among extremely closely related animals. The question is 
whether such differences can be expected in more general types of 
learning. 
The discussion of general and specific adaptations by Bolles (1985a) 
provides a good framework for this discussion. He points out that some 
adaptations are 
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common, but unrelated, evolutionary adjustments to common 
circumstances. The phenomenon is called convergence, and color 
vision is an illustration of it. Full spectrum color vision pops up here 
and there in the evolutionary tree ... it appears in some mam-
mals, in most birds, in some fish, and in some of the arthropods. 
Animals in between are more or less color-blind ... One way to 
think of color vision is that it has been discovered or invented sev-
eral times independently. (p. 394) 
Bolles (1985a) contrasts these reversible adaptations with others that ap-
parently are not reversible, such as feathers: 
Only birds have feathers. But the feather idea was apparently stu-
pendously successful, because there are no birds without feath-
ers. Once feathers came upon the scene, that was it, all descen-
dants were stuck with feathers. Some birds (e.g., penguins) have 
funny feathers .... [Feathers] may change shape and size and 
color and waxiness and so on, but evidently if you have feathers 
you can depend upon all your descendants having feathers .... 
Is associative learning like feathers? Is the ability to learn such a 
stupendous advantage that once in possession of it, there is no way 
back? (pp. 394-395) 
There can be little doubt that some specialized forms of learning are 
like color vision. Song learning appears scattered, albeit fairly widely, 
among passerines, varying significantly in its characteristics. The same 
may be said of imprinting. But are there forms of learning that are like 
feathers? 
Bolles suggests that associative learning may be like feathers. The 
similarity in basic conditioning processes among widely different spe-
cies suggests that this is so. The same argument can be made about the 
law of effect. The effects of reinforcement have also been demonstrated 
in many species. However, several points must be made about the anal-
ogy between feathers and learning. 
First of all, even if some kinds of learning are like feathers, this does 
not mean there are not important differences between species in the 
learning. Although all feathers have certain features in common, they 
also vary. They are different at different stages of a bird's life and on dif-
ferent parts of a bird's body. And there are substantial variations be-
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tween avian species. A large part of understanding feathers is under-
standing this variation. We need to examine even the most general kinds 
of learning for significant variation. To do so will require knowledge of 
the function of learning. I will return to this point later. 
Second, even if there are general kinds of learning, this does not nec-
essarily settle the question of homology and analogy. These concepts are 
labels for two very different possible evolutionary reasons for similarity 
between species. Homology is similarity through common evolutionary 
origin or descent. Its counterpart is analogy-similarity despite sepa-
rate evolutionary origin because of similar adaptive pressure (see Atz, 
1970, for a discussion of the difficulties of applying these concepts to be-
havior). General forms of learning, unlike feathers, may have arisen two 
or more times during evolutionary history. For example, the similarities 
Bitterman and his co-workers have found between associative learning 
in honeybees and mammals may be the result of analogy, or conver-
gence (Abramson & Bitterman, 1986). It can be argued that the world is 
structured in such a way that any learning mechanism that accurately 
and efficiently predicted events would have to have certain character-
istics, namely those that associative learning shows. (Dennett, 1975, has 
argued that the law of effect must be part of any adequate and complete 
psychological theory. This philosophical argument implies that evolu-
tion may have invented the law of effect any number of times.) 
Third, it would be premature at this time to attempt to decide wheth-
er any particular kind of learning is general. Biological variation, wheth-
er in general adaptations like feathers or in more specialized adapta-
tions like color vision, requires some understanding of the function of 
the trait in question. Variation in feathers and in color vision relates to 
adaptive functioning. For example, in the case of color vision one can 
hypothesize that honeybees have color vision because they feed from 
colorful flowers (and this is exactly what made von Frisch, 1954, so sure 
that honeybees did have color vision). 
The problem is that in the case of possibly general processes of learn-
ing, we have little idea of their specific functions. One can reasonably 
speculate that association learning is useful for an animal because it al-
lows accurate prediction of future events. One can reasonably argue that 
the law of effect is useful because it allows the animal to obtain resources 
like food or water. But these are very general arguments and do not eas-
ily lead to the selection of particular species for study on ecological 
grounds. What is needed is some more definitive and specific idea of 
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how learning and cognitive processes actually function under natural 
conditions. Fortunately, for the first time recent developments in be-
havioral ecology are making data relevant to this problem available in a 
substantial way. 
LEARNING IN THE FIELD 
Certain kinds of learning have long been known to occur in the natural 
world of animals: song learning and imprinting are the outstanding ex-
amples. But these are specialized forms of learning. Is there any evi-
dence that the types of learning psychologists have typically been in-
terested in occur outside the laboratory? 
Many have maintained that learning in a more general sense is not 
important to animals under natural conditions (Boice, 1977; Lockard, 
1971). This presented a problem to anyone attempting an evolutionary, 
adaptive approach to learning. If learning is unimportant in the field, 
why is it so evident in the laboratory? Do animals carry around what Boice 
called surplusage-unneeded and unnecessary abilities? 
The problem appears to have been methodological, at least in part. 
Learning is much more difficult to observe than is learned behavior. 
Imagine a bird eating a monarch butterfly and subsequently throwing 
up. After that experience, it will simply avoid eating monarchs (Brower, 
1969). The scientist watching birds would have to see the brief first en-
counter to understand that later avoidance of monarchs was learned. This 
raises the second problem. The identification of learning requires doc-
umenting changes in the behavior of individuals over time. Until rela-
tively recently, there were very few extended field studies of known or 
marked individuals. In the past 20 to 30 years such studies have become 
much more common, thanks in part to the emergence of behavioral 
ecology. These studies have revealed that animals in their natural en-
vironments face many problems that they appear to solve through 
learning and cognition (see Krebs & Davies, 1978, 1984, for reviews of 
behavioral ecology; Shettleworth, 1984, for an explicit discussion of the 
behavioral ecology of learning). For example, bumblebees learn how to 
handle different flower species and which flowers are most profitable 
(Heinrich, 1979); nectar-feeding birds remember which flowers they have 
emptied (Gass & Montgomerie, 1981; Kamil, 1978); food-caching birds 
remember the locations of their stored food (Kamil & Balda, 1985; Shet-
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tleworth & Krebs, 1982) as well as the contents of the caches (Sherry, 
1984); and young vervet monkeys learn the social relationships among 
members of their groups (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1986). In light of the ac-
cumulating evidence, it is difficult to conceive of anyone's believing that 
learning is not important in the natural world of animals outside the lab-
oratory. 
In addition to these empirical developments, important theoretical 
developments in behavioral ecology have emphasized the potential bi-
ological importance of learning. A variety of models have shown that if 
animals are sensitive to many of the features of their environment, they 
can increase the efficiency of their behavior. For example, the original 
"diet" selection model of MacArthur and Pianka (1966) assumes that 
predators know the nutritional value and density of their prey and the 
time required to handle it. Given that they possess this information and 
that they can rank prey types in terms of the ratio of nutritional value to 
handling time, a relatively simple rule can determine which prey types 
should be eaten whenever encountered and which ones should never 
be eaten in any given set of circumstances. Although this model has not 
been completely successful in predicting selection among prey types, it 
has had considerable success (for recent reviews see Krebs, Stephens, 
& Sutherland, 1983; Schoener, 1987). Studies stimulated by this model 
have shown that animals respond adaptively to changes in the density 
of their prey (e.g., Goss-Custard, 1981; Krebs, Erichsen, Webber, & 
Charnov, 1977) and learn to rank different prey types as the model pre-
dicts (Pulliam, 1980). Other models have similarly predicted learning ef-
fects that have been confirmed by subsequent experiments (see Kamil 
& Roitblat, 1985, for review; see Stephens & Krebs, 1986, for detailed 
presentation of foraging theory, especially chap. 4). 
There can be no doubt that animals use learning to modify their be-
havior under natural conditions and that such learning can have very 
important adaptive implications. This is good news for the student of 
animal learning: the phenomena we have been interested in are biolog-
ically significant. However, we must also recognize the implications of 
this conclusion, the most central being that the study of learning must 
be placed in a biological context, and we must deal with the thorny 
problems this outlook raises. 
In summary, then, three types of research indicate the need for a bi-
ological approach to learning: (1) biological constraints, which clearly 
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show that the evolutionary history of the species can affect the outcome 
of conditioning experiments in a variety of ways; (2) studies of special-
ized learning, which indicate that there can be significant variation in 
learning mechanisms that correlate with the ecologies of the species being 
studied; and (3) evidence from behavioral ecology, which shows that 
general forms of learning are of adaptive significance and may also, 
therefore, vary in ways that correlate with ecology. 
The Implications of an Adaptive 
Approach to Intelligence 
In earlier sections of this chapter, I argued that learning is adaptive and 
proposed that the synthetic approach should operate under that as-
sumption. This assumption has important comparative implications, 
primarily that there must be significant variation in intelligence among 
species. Why is this a necessary implication? 
Let us return to the feather analogy used by Bolles (1985a). He point-
ed out that learning might be like feathers-such a stupendously suc-
cessful adaptation that, once developed, it could not be lost. Some might 
be tempted to use this analogy to argue that some adaptations are so 
successful that they simply do not vary significantly among species that 
possess them. This conclusion is not supported by available evidence 
on successful adaptations. 
Feathers represent an extremely successful adaptation. But not all 
feathers are the same. Different types of feathers serve different func-
tions and have different structures. Some feathers, such as down, serve 
as insulation. Other feathers function primarily in flight. Still others, the 
filoplumes, apparently serve as sensory organs, sensitive to the posi-
tion of other feathers. Furthermore, within a feather type there can be 
considerable between species variation in structure between species that 
is related to special adaptations. For example, the underside of an owl's 
wings has a velvety pile produced by special processes of the barbules, 
which reduces the sound of the wings when the owl swoops down on 
prey. Birds of the open sky have long primary flight feathers best suited 
to fast, straight flight, whereas woodland birds have shorter primaries 
that increase maneuverability. Diving birds have overlapping feathers 
that reduce drag (Lucas & Stettenheim, 1972; Spearman & Hardy, 1985). 
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The list of functional variations of feathers is extremely long, even with-
out mentioning perhaps the biggest source of variation, the evolution 
of brightly colored feathers for interspecific display. 
The point of this discussion of more than you (or I) ever wanted to 
know about feathers is that traits with adaptive functions vary between 
species, in ways that make sense in terms of the ecology and adapta-
tions of the organisms they serve. If animal intelligence is adaptive-
and as I have already stated, ample evidence of this is emerging-then 
intelligence must vary between species. The variation may be qualita-
tive or quantitative; intelligence may consist of a complex of processes. 
But differences there must be. I cannot think of a single adaptive trait 
that does not vary in some way between species, often closely related 
species-the structure of the eye, the forelimb or hind limb, the stom-
ach, the lungs. Why should animal intelligence be any different? 
One reason animal intelligence could be different has been proposed 
by Shettleworth (1982, 1984)-the distinction between function and 
mechanism. Shettleworth argues that because natural selection selects 
only among outcomes, not among the processes that produce them, any 
of a number of different mechanisms may be selected in any given sit-
uation. While this is true in global terms, it may well be false when ex-
amined in detail. Different mechanisms are unlikely to produce exactly 
the same outputs. In fact, as long as we are limited to input-output stud-
ies of the mechanisms of intelligence, we will classify two mechanisms 
producing the same results as the same mechanism (as would evolu-
tion). 
However, as in the computer program example explored earlier, dif-
ferent mechanisms are likely to have different input-output relation-
ships. If the input-output relationships differ, detailed analysis may 
prove that one mechanism is more functional than the other for prob-
lems the species faces. In that case natural selection will favor the more 
functional mechanism. 
Returning to the main argument, my analysis of Macphail's ap-
proach to the evolution of intelligence among vertebrates suggests that 
his analysis is based upon prevailing but unproductive assumptions and 
definitions. Macphail recognized this possibility when he pointed out 
that "even the tentative advocacy of [the null] hypothesis is in effect a 
reductio ad absurdum which merely indicates that comparative psychol-
ogy has followed a systematically incorrect route" (Macphail, 1982, p. 
334). That is exactly my contention. The challenge is to devise an alter-
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native approach that can be used to investigate the evolution of animal 
intelligence while avoiding the snares that entangled Macphail and 
others. 
Another potential problem with the literature upon which Mac-
phail's analysis is based must also be noted. It is quite conceivable, per-
haps even likely, that some mechanisms of intelligence are widespread 
throughout broad segments of the animal kingdom while others are not. 
Indeed, one could argue that the literature on classical conditioning 
demonstrates that the associationistic mechanisms involved are wide-
spread whereas the literature on song learning, for example, demon-
strates narrow distribution of song-learning mechanisms. It may be that 
the psychological study of animal learning has concentrated upon gen-
eral mechanisms, ignoring those with more limited distribution. But 
some of these mechanisms of limited distribution may be more general, 
across tasks, than very specific forms of learning like song learning. In 
particular, some more complex forms of learning-so far little studied 
outside a few primate or avian species-deserve comparative attention 
(Humphrey, 1976). 
Research Strategies 
The purpose of this section is to propose a set of research strategies to 
further our knowledge of animal intelligence. In outlining these strate-
gies I have been guided by the two criticisms of the traditional approach 
developed earlier: that we know relatively little about the intellectual ca-
pacities of animals and that we understand very little about how these 
capacities function or evolved. I have also sought to develop a set of 
strategies that will avoid the problems revealed by analysis of Mac-
phail's review of the comparative literature on animalleaming. 
There are two components to any strategy for studying animal intel-
ligence: selecting the procedures to be used and selecting the species to 
be studied. These are not unrelated problems. Research will proceed 
most readily if there is a good match between the task employed and the 
species under study. 
These suggested research strategies originate from several con-
siderations: (1) the characteristics of research that has produced good 
evidence for complex intelligent processes in animals; (2) the decision-
making processes that are being revealed by laboratory and field re-
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search in behavioral ecology; and (3) an examination of the biological 
approach to comparative research. 
DEVELOPING A NATURAL HISTORY 
OF ANIMAL INTELLIGENCE 
One important step to developing a new approach to the comparative 
study of animal intelligence will be to develop a natural history of ani-
mal intelligence. This would consist of a detailed study of intelligence 
under natural conditions. The focus would be upon the problems ani-
mals are faced with in the field and how they use their mental capacities 
to solve them. In many cases field experiments or laboratory work closely 
coupled to natural history would be necessary. 
I have already referred to many examples of field data that demon-
strate or suggest how intelligence is used to solve the problems nature 
presents to animals. These include timing in hummingbirds, spatial 
memory in food-storing animals, and knowledge of social relationships 
in primates. The two major arenas for the operation of animal intelli-
gence are foraging and social behavior. These areas need to be examined 
much more closely, and in a wider variety of species, from the point of 
view of the functional significance of animal intelligence. 
USING NATURAL HISTORY TO CHOOSE 
SPECIES AND DESIGN PROCEDURES 
Once the study of natural history has revealed a particular problem that 
is (or might be) solved by learning in the field, this knowledge can be 
used to select species for study and to design experimental procedures 
for testing. This is a strategy ethologists have used with considerable 
success in studying "specialized" learning such as song learning, im-
printing, and migration. There are also a number of examples of this ap-
proach dealing with processes that may be more general. These include 
the detection of cryptic prey (Bond, 1983; Pietrewicz & Kamil, 1981); 
spatial memory in food-caching parids (Sherry, 1984; Sherry, Krebs, & 
Cowie, 1981; Shettleworth & Krebs, 1982) and nutcrackers (Balda, 1980; 
Kamil & Balda, 1985); and pitch perception in starlings (Hulse, Cynx, & 
Humpal, 1984). 
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Another approach has been to design experimental situations to test 
models of natural behavior, particularly optimal foraging models. For 
example, there have been tests of patch selection (Smith & Sweatman, 
1974), within-patch persistence (Cowie, 1977; Kamil & Yoerg, 1985; Ka-
mil, Yoerg & Clements, in press), and collecting food to be brought to a 
central place (Kacelnik, 1984; Kacelnik & Cuthill, 1987). One problem 
with some of these studies is that researchers sometimes fail to consider 
whether the species they choose to study are appropriate for the model 
they wish to test. 
This raises the general point of evaluating ecological validity. It is rel-
atively easy to argue that laboratory tasks should reflect the problems 
animals normally face in nature. But it is not so easy to judge how well 
any particular task meets that requirement. The best way to address this 
issue is to collect laboratory data that can be compared with effects known 
to occur in the field. For example, when Pietrewicz and I were first de-
veloping our procedure for studying cryptic prey detection by training 
jays to detect cryptic moths in slides, we collected data that could be 
checked against phenomena known to occur in the field. We found that 
the moths in the slides were least detectable by the jays when shown in 
their species-typical body orientation (Pietrewicz & Kamil, 1977). The jays 
slow their search immediately after finding a moth (unpublished data), 
a result identical to the "area-restricted search" often observed in the field 
(Croze, 1970). They also search more slowly when the prey are more 
cryptic (Getty, Kamil, & Real, 1987; Kamil & Olson, in preparation), an 
effect also analogous to data collected in the field (Fitzpatrick, 1981). 
These isomorphisms between laboratory and field mean that when we 
investigate parameters that cannot be studied under natural conditions, 
there is some reason to believe the results are applicable to the field. 
We hope that adopting this research strategy based upon natural his-
tory will have two effects: first, that it will lead to a clearer and fuller un-
derstanding of animal intelligence; second, that it will change the focus 
of research on animal learning and cognition, making it more animal 
oriented and less process oriented. This will allow greater integration 
with organismic biology. It will also focus more attention on a crucial ev-
olutionary issue, the adaptive significance of animal intelligence. But it 
will not solve the problem of contextual stimuli and the difficulty of es-
tablishing that species differences in learning or cognition even exist. 
However, the synthetic approach does suggest some ways around this 
problem. 
298 
NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 1987 
USING EXTERN AL CRITERIA TO MAKE 
COMPARATIVE PREDICTIONS 
One way to minimize the problem of using contextual stimuli as an al-
ternative explanation for species differences is to have some external cri-
terion that predicts differences among a number of species. For exam-
ple, Rumbaugh and Pate (1984) have used an index of encephalization 
to predict species differences among seven nonhuman primate species 
on a complex learning task. The encephalization index accurately pre-
dicts the performance of the species. Since there are many predictions, 
supported in detail by the comparative data, contextual stimuli do not 
provide a likely alternative explanation. The probability that contextual 
stimuli will produce a ranking of nine species by chance is exceedingly 
small. Thus the use of an external criterion to make a priori specific pre-
dictions provides an explicit alternative to the null hypothesis of no spe-
cies differences. If this alternative makes many predictions and these are 
supported, then contextual stimuli cannot be taken seriously as an ex-
planation. 
Indexes of brain size or encephalization provide one source of exter-
nal predictions. These indexes may be particularly useful for comparing 
closely related species, as in Rumbaugh's research program. Natural 
history and ecological considerations can provide another source of a 
priori predictions of species differences in animal intelligence. If some 
animals face specific foraging or social problems that others do not face, 
and if learning is used to solve these problems, then a comparative pre-
diction is at least implicit. For example, do food-storing birds have a 
greater ability to remember spatial locations than other birds? Are ani-
mals that utilize food resources that are renewed on a strong temporal 
schedule, like trap-lining hummingbirds, better at timing? Are animals 
that live in stable, long-lasting social groups better able to learn about 
social relationships either between themselves and others or among 
others? 
The key to overcoming the problem posed by contextual variables is 
generating multiple predictions about species differences. The ecolog-
ical approach leads to such multiple predictions because of the process-
es of convergence and divergence. Divergence refers to differences be-
tween closely related species owing to differences in their ecologies. The 
differences in the beaks of the Galapagos finches are the classic case. 
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Convergence refers to similarities between distantly related species be-
cause of similar ecological pressures and adaptations. For example, nec-
tar feeding has evolved independently among many groups of birds, in-
cluding the hummingbirds of North and South America, the honey 
creepers of Hawaii, and the sunbirds of Africa and Asia. Many of these 
birds have decurved beaks that are well suited to extracting nectar from 
flowers. 
The ways convergence and divergence can be used to generate mul-
tiple predictions can be seen by considering a specific example. Suppose 
one hypothesized that nectar feeders should have particularly good 
spatial memory (Kamil, 1978) or timing ability (Gill, in press). This hy-
pothesis could be tested by comparing closely related animals, only some 
of which feed on nectar, such as the Hawaiian honey creepers, which 
vary enormously in foraging specializations. Any supporting evidence 
could then be tested with other groups of nectar-feeding birds. It could 
also be tested by doing comparative research with other groups that in-
clude nectar feeders, such as bats. 
The strategy of selecting species for study based upon convergence 
and divergence can be applied to many aspects of animal intelligence. 
For example, if the social context has been crucial for the evolution of 
learning, as Cheney and Seyfarth (1985) suggest, then at least some of 
the phenomena observed in group-living primates should be found in 
some avian species. Many birds have long life spans spent in stable 
groups with established genealogies (e.g., Florida scrub jays-Wool-
fenden & Fitzpatrick, 1984; bee eaters-Emlen, 1981). Some of these 
groups have been studied for as long as 20 years. The findings reported 
suggest that these birds may be making judgments of the sort described 
for primates, but the appropriate data have not been collected. It would 
be important to collect them. 
USING SPECIFIC PROCESSES TO GENERATE 
MULTIPLE PREDICTIONS 
Another way to minimize the interpretive problems posed by contex-
tual variables is to design several experimental procedures, each mea-
suring the same intellectual ability, and test'two or more species with all 
the procedures. The species tested should be chosen with some external 
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criterion so that specific predictions are made in advance. Then if the 
results of each of the procedures indicate the same ordering of the spe-
cies, contextual variables are unlikely to be responsible. 
One example of this strategy can be found in ongoing research on 
spatial memory in Clark's nutcrackers. These birds are known to use 
spatial memory in recovering their caches (Balda, 1980; Balda, Kamil, & 
Grim, 1986; Kamil & Balda, 1985). This memory is remarkable in at least 
two ways: it is long lasting and of large capacity. We have found that 
nutcrackers perform better than pigeons in an open field analogue of the 
radial maze (Balda & Kamil, in press). Data collected by Olson (in prep-
aration) indicate that the nutcrackers also perform better than pigeons 
in a spatial operant task. As data from different settings accumulate and 
are consistent in showing that nutcrackers remember spatial locations 
better than pigeons, our confidence that there is a species difference in 
cognitive ability increases. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter I have argued for a new, broader approach to studying 
the evolution of the cognitive capacities of animals. This synthetic ap-
proach is based upon several arguments. (1) Data from the natural world 
of animals as well as from the laboratory clearly show that the intellec-
tual capacities of animals are greater than previously thought. This means 
that we need to use a broad definition of animal intelligence. (2) The tra-
ditional psychological approach to the study of animal learning has been 
defined too narrowly, and its logic has prevented meaningful compar-
ative, evolutionary analysis. (3) The literature on several phenomena, 
including constraints on learning and "specialized" learning, indicates 
that an approach based on research strategies drawn from biology and 
behavioral ecology can be useful in analyzing the evolution of animal 
intelligence. (4) As a prerequisite to engaging in a meaning comparative 
analysis of animal cognition, we must develop hypotheses that make 
multiple and detailed predictions about species differences in intelli-
gence. Natural history and behavioral ecology are important sources of 
such hypotheses. 
We have a great deal yet to learn about the cognitive abilities of ani-
mals. If we adopt a broad approach, using the best of what psychology 
and biology have to offer, we are most likely to succeed in our efforts to 
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understand these abilities and their evolution. The next twenty years of 
research on these problems should be very exciting. 
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